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a b s t r a c t
This article discusses the geopolitical dimension of maritime security, which has been neglected by
scholars despite the growing number of studies devoted to a variety of aspects related to maritime
security. The first step consists in clarifying the definitions of the two concepts; ‘geopolitics’ and
‘maritime security’. Then the article introduces the geopolitical dimension of maritime security from a
conceptual perspective, and then analyses three practical examples of maritime security geo-strategies
released in 2014. The results demonstrate that states’ and international institutions’ maritime security
objectives and interests are indirectly and directly influenced by geographical and geopolitical
considerations, although this link is only tacitly acknowledged in official documents. Scholars and
practitioners interested in maritime security are encouraged to further engage with this dimension.
& 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Maritime security is a fairly recent expression, which has become
a buzzword in the past decade [2], especially within the maritime
community. Maritime security can be understood as a concept
referring to the security of the maritime domain or as a set of policies,
regulations, measures and operations to secure the maritime domain.
In academia, the term ‘maritime security’was almost absent from the
debates about the security of the maritime domain until the
beginning of the 2000's. Since 2002, the number of references to
maritime security in the academic literature has increased linearly
(c.f. Fig. 1). This increase in academic literature on maritime security
can be explained by the conjunction of the three following factors: 1)
the impacts of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (notably the launch of
counter-terrorist operations at sea), 2) the occurrence of three high
visibility terrorist acts against ships (USS Cole in 2001, French tanker
Limburg in 2002 and Filipino passenger ship SuperFerry 14 in 2004),
and 3) the rise of piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca at the
beginning of the century. Then the surge of piracy at the Horn of
Africa between 2007 and 2012 largely contributed to generating
academic debates beyond strategic and security studies, with scho-
lars from various disciplines discussing the legal, criminal, cultural,
economic, military, environmental and energy dimensions of piracy
in particular and maritime security in general.
Between 1989 and 2014, Google Scholars lists more than 16,000
references comprising the exact phrase ‘maritime security’ compared
to only 218 between 1914 and 1988 (Google Scholar Search, [13]).
However, despite this academic interest, the geopolitical dimension
of maritime security has been overlooked by practitioners and
scholars alike. Only a handful of scholars have started to discuss
the link between maritime security and geopolitics, mainly focusing
on the Indian Ocean, the European Union (EU) or both (e.g.
[12,14,17,18,20]). The aim of this article is to shed light on this
overlooked dimension and to propose ways to integrate it within the
emergent field of maritime security studies. The first step consists in
clarifying the definitions of the two concepts; ‘geopolitics’ and
‘maritime security’, since both of them are open to various, often
divergent and modular, interpretations. Then the article introduces
the geopolitical dimension of maritime security from a conceptual
perspective and analyses three practical examples of maritime
security geo-strategies released in 2014, which demonstrate the
importance of geographical and geopolitical considerations for mar-
itime security studies.
2. Definitions
The term ‘geopolitics’ has been employed indiscriminately by both
practitioners and scholars in reference to states’ zones of interest or
influence and how they clash with each other’s. This meaning is both
vague and limited; it does not account for the full significance of the
term, and even bears a negative connotation due to the emphasis on
power politics. After all, Nazi Germany’s expansionist foreign policy
goals were justified using ‘geopolitical’ arguments based on simplistic
(and erroneous) geographical naturalisations. In the 21st century,
geopolitics as an academic discipline has lost its prescriptive nature.
It actually aims at explaining how geography somewhat constrains
politics, how states try to bypass those constraints, and (in the case of
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critical geopolitics) how they try to use geography to their advantage,
including in discourses through series of geo-informed representa-
tions. In practice states and other international actors take into account
the constraining impacts of geographical factors. They develop and
tacitly or explicitly endorse ‘geopolitical visions’ or ‘geo-strategies’ that
directly or indirectly guide their foreign and security policy goals and
activities. In other words, both in practice and in the collective
imaginaries, geography contributes to defining the boundaries of what
is possible to achieve in international relations along with other
material and ideational factors.
The expression ‘maritime security’ is recent. Before the end of
the Cold War it was rarely used and primarily in reference to sea
control over maritime areas in the context of the superpower
confrontation, that is to say in a naval context. It is thus not
surprising that during the Cold War maritime security was more
frequently employed in references to geopolitical considerations
(such as sovereignty claims over maritime territories, the status of
coastal waters, and the control over maritime zones) than in the
21st century. Since the end of the 1990's and the beginning of the
2000's, maritime security was increasingly used to describe pre-
ventive measures set up to respond to illegal activities at sea or
from the sea (including the protection of shipping and ports).
Terrorism (post 9/11) and piracy (especially after 2007 and the rise
of attacks at the Horn of Africa) attracted most of the media’s
attention. However, arms and drug trafficking, people smuggling,
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUUF), and deliberate
pollution still represent the bulk of illegal and disruptive activities
at sea. Today, states and international actors such as the EU have
adopted a more comprehensive and pro-active approach to
maritime security, which centres around the exercise of the
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea to implement
and maintain security, safety and good governance within the
maritime domain, with both preventive measures (e.g. port
security regulations) and reactive measures (e.g. counter-piracy
operations). Maritime security is increasingly linked to economic
and environmental considerations, as illustrated by the EU Inte-
grated Maritime Policy (IMP) adopted in 2007 and the Blue Growth
initiative adopted in 2012 [4,5]. Indeed, although the main driver
of the IMP has been economic growth, the success of the Blue
Growth strategy rests on a safe and secure maritime domain,
which grants economic agents with the stability and certainties
they expect to see before they make any investment. Marine
environment and fisheries protection as well as maritime surveil-
lance initiatives have been instrumental in raising maritime
security objectives to the top of the security agenda of various
state and non-state actors.
The geopolitical dimension of maritime security accounts for
the way geography constrains and informs (directly or indirectly)
maritime security policies, regulations, measures and operations,
as well as how states take (tacitly or explicitly) geography into
account when developing their maritime security strategies.
3. Geography and maritime security
Geographical ‘permanence’ such as the length of a country’s
coastline or the absence of direct access to the high seas constrains
seapower in general (e.g. [16]) and maritime security policies in
particular, “for geography does not argue. It simply is” ([19]: 236).
This in no way means that politics and policies are determined by
geography but that geographical factors need to be taken into
account in the list of explanatory factors along with other material,
structural and ideational factors.
Maritime security has to do with (illegal and disruptive) human
activities in the maritime milieu, that is to say a certain geographi-
cally delimited space. Thus, states are differently impacted by
maritime security threats depending on their actual geographical
location. For example, in the case of illegal immigration by sea, Italy
is more directly impacted than (for instance) the United Kingdom,
because of its very geographical location. Sicily and especially the
island of Lampedusa are located directly on the main (and one of
the shortest) immigration route from North Africa to the EU and
have thus sustained a constant flow of illegal migrants for the past
decades. In other words, even if Britain, France or Germany may be
the ultimate destination goal of illegal migrants crossing the
Mediterranean on small boats, Italy, Spain (through the Gibraltar
Strait) and Malta are more easily, quickly (and relatively safely)
accessible by boat than the UK or even France, due to evident
geographical factors. As a result Italy has to spend more resources
on counter-immigration than many other EU states, which explains
its recent request for the EU’s assistance in dealing with counter-
immigration at sea in central Mediterranean, leading to the launch
of FRONTEX operation Triton in November 2014. This example
illustrates that simple geographical realities have constraining
impacts on states’ maritime security policies, notably when it comes
to regulating human activities at sea.
The same reasoning works for other types of illegal flow within
the maritime domain. For example, drug smuggling directly impacts
countries located on the main routes, such as Spain through the
Gibraltar Strait, or those whose coasts are difficult to monitor due to
a negative ratio between the length of the coast to police and the
resources at the disposal of the navy/coast-guard. This can be the
case for small states such as for example Ireland with limited
resources and a rather extended coastline or powerful states such as
the United States, which despite the resources at the disposal of its
coast-guard service has such a long coast to monitor and is the
intended destination goal of so much drug trafficking that it still
struggles to ‘seal’ its maritime borders. Here the geographical factor
(length of coasts) is clearly not sufficient to explain the burden of
counter-narcotics. Material power (such as the coast-guard budget)
and drug traffickers’ business strategies (privileged destination
countries) need to be factored in the explanation. As shown in
Table 1, the geographical factor is still very relevant. Despite the US
deploying almost 20 times more coast-guard vessels, each of those


















Fig. 1. Evolution between 1989 and 2014 of the number of academic publications
mentioning ‘maritime security’ listed by Google Scholars.
Source: Google Scholars search [13]
Table 1
Ratio between length of coast and coast-guard resources (comparison Ireland –
USA).




Ratio (km of coast
per ship)
Ireland 1500 8 OPV 187
USA 20,000 More than 159 coast-guard
vessels
125
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62 km shorter than the one devoted to each Irish offshore patrol
vessels (OPV).
States’ involvement in maritime security also depends on non-
geographical factors such as governments’ capabilities and/or will
to tackle maritime security threats. For example, Somalia has not
been in a position to control illegal activities in its own territorial
waters (hence the need for foreign maritime capacity-building
operations, such as EUCAP Nestor). Empowering secessionist Soma-
liland’s and autonomist Puntland’s own coast-guard forces shows
the importance of political will and material realities as explanatory
factors. It has also been argued that in certain South East Asian
countries, police or naval forces are reluctant to engage in counter-
piracy activities and could even be “complicit in these crimes,
especially in areas where a culture of corruption (possibly boosted
by underpaid maritime security forces or smuggling activities) has
evolved under years of authoritarian governments” ([3]: 79).
Due to the global nature of the maritime domain and to the
transnational nature of many of the current maritime security threats
(immigration, drug smuggling, piracy, etc.), countries not directly
impacted by the threats coming from the sea can nevertheless decide
to contribute to the policing efforts, based on the understanding that
they will eventually be impacted later. For example the EU has set up
the FRONTEX agency to deal with illegal immigration and coordinate
member states’ activities in this field, based on the principle that
member states are all impacted by the consequences of illegal
immigration to the EU whatever their geographical location.
Counter-immigration at sea represents a major part of FRONTEX’s
budget and activities; in 2012, the largest share (42.3%) of the
agency’s operational budget (excluding risk analyses and research
& technology) went to sea borders joint operations (Frontex, [9]: 32).
In 2013, within the FRONTEX framework, North European countries
such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Latvia and landlocked countries
such as Austria, Luxembourg and even non-EU member Switzerland
have contributed to counter-immigration operations taking place in
the wider Mediterranean area (Frontex, [10]: 59). This shows that
states include geographically distant maritime regions into their
security perimeter, for transnational threats need to be tackled
beyond one’s external boundary. Controlling the sea far away from
home is of strategic value. It represents a means to expand one’s zone
of control and competencies beyond one’s external boundary, which
can be considered as a form of post-modern territorial expansion
(e.g. [11]). It must however be noted that overseas possessions imply
the right and the duty to maintain a (naval) presence there, which is
mainly about affirming one’s sovereignty, although overseas naval
bases and prepositioning can also contribute to power projection and
naval diplomacy.
Maritime security threats are also used in geopolitical dis-
courses as an argument (amongst others) justifying the projection
of security beyond one’s external boundary [12]. In other words,
geographical representations framed within the ‘safe/inside’ ver-
sus ‘unsafe/outside’ dichotomy encompass maritime elements. For
example, the seas surrounding Europe are represented as vectors
of threats in both EU’s and member states’ discourses, which may
then justify various (sometimes controversial) projection activities
in the maritime periphery of Europe. Securing the freedom of the
seas and policing the ‘global commons’ justifies projecting regula-
tions, norms but also police and naval forces beyond one’s
territorial or jurisdictional waters. In other words, maritime
security has a geopolitical dimension. The control of distant
maritime areas is presented as vital to assure security on land.
This construction of threats along geographical lines and the
practical consequences in terms of power and forces projection
are strengthened by the fact that the boundary between naval
deployments and maritime security operations is growingly
blurred, which is illustrated by counter-terrorist and counter-
piracy operations currently taking place at the Horn of Africa,
which result in the deployment of frigates within war-like coali-
tions. It is interesting to note that the deployment of frigates
instead of patrol vessels is mainly due to geographical considera-
tions; the units sent by the US, the Europeans or the Chinese need
to sustain operating for a long period far away from their bases,
which is beyond the capacity of many coast-guard patrol vessels.
As will be discussed below, the geopolitical dimension of maritime
security also reflects in current maritime security strategies.
4. Maritime security (geo) strategies
States and regional organisations such as NATO and the EU have
interests linked to maritime security, which go beyond securing the
freedom of the seas. Thus maritime security concerns integr-
ate within broader geo-strategies. A number of states, as well as
the EU, have recently elaborated specific maritime security strategies.
These documents tend to include a geopolitical dimension, although
sometimes rather tacitly. This section analyses three maritime
security strategies, all released in 2014: the UK National Strategy
for Maritime Security (NSMS), the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EU
MSS), and the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). This choice of
text responds to the need to discuss current narrative practices, since
the concept of maritime security has only recently been broadened
(as discussed above). The texts are located in different planes, since
the first was elaborated by a state (the UK) whereas the second and
the third by a supranational actor (the EU). This allows conducting a
comparison between the UK (that is to say a state with pro-active
security policies and substantial material power to back it) and the
EU (that is to say a supranational actor whose security policies reflect
compromises between all member states and which suffers from a
deficit of means when it comes to applying security policies). Two
variables are under scrutiny: 1) the ‘geopolitical approach towards
maritime security’, for which two categories are defined; a tacit
versus an explicit approach, and 2) the ‘extent to which geopolitical
considerations inform policy objectives’, for which two categories are
defined; a direct versus indirect influence. The indicators employed
for the coding are exposed in Table 2. They are then applied to the
analysis of the three above-mentioned strategies (codes in brackets).
The presence of an explicit link between maritime security and
geopolitics is measured by the occurrence of unequivocal references
to the concept of geopolitics and to the fact that geography influences
maritime security. The direct influence of geopolitical factors on
maritime security objectives is measured by the occurrence of
unequivocal references to geopolitical interests in the maritime
domain and to geographical locations when referring to maritime
security objectives.
4.1. The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)
The NSMS stresses that the UK is “an island trading nation”
([15]: 18) with overseas territories and global interests. Conse-
quently, maritime security is very important for Britain both in
terms of economic and national security: fisheries protection in the
territorial waters and EEZs of Great Britain and overseas territories,
security of sea lanes of communication, energy security, and drug-
interdiction represent vital interests (Tgeopol1). Some regions are
specifically described as prone to maritime security issues and of
interest to the UK’s security: the Arctic, the South and East China
seas, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Caribbean (26–
37) (Tgeopol2). The UK NSSM explicitly acknowledges the UK’s
political will and capabilities to protect British maritime security
interests wherever needed, i.e. with no geographical limitation
(DgeoInfl2):
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We deploy Royal Navy ships acting independently or as part of
an international force to maintain vital trade routes and ensure
freedom of navigation, including a persistent forward presence
in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. We also
deploy specialised Naval shipping and capabilities to key
chokepoints in order to understand and influence these areas,
and if necessary to take action to prevent and respond (33).
Following the traditional British approach to seapower as an
economic and security enabler, the NSMS highlights the fact that the
high seas are part of the “global commons” (25), which implies
freedom of navigation and a common responsibility for the main-
tenance of security (IGeoInfl2). Leading maritime nations such as the
UKmust then adopt a leading role in policing and securing the global
commons, as well as in maritime capacity building, since “promoting
a secure international maritime domain […] will benefit all nations”
(18). The NSMS has thus a clear geo-strategic and geo-security
dimension, since it justifies and further encourages British forces to
operate beyond jurisdictional waters, “within the UK Marine Area
and beyond” (41), that is to say “across the maritime domain” and
“on a global scale” (19) so as to contribute to maritime security in
general and to fulfil British national interest in particular (IGeoInfl1).
4.2. The European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EU MSS)
The EU MSS was drafted by the Commission in March 2014
(Commission, [6]), then the Council adopted a revised version on
24 June 2014. The two documents do not diverge much, although
some important omissions are to be found in the Council’s
approved version, which reflect member states’ reservations about
the deployment of the EU’s seapower.
The EU stresses its will, interests and responsibility to con-
tribute to promoting “better maritime governance” ([8]: 8), for
example by launching maritime capacity building missions (such
as EUCAP Nestor at the Horn of Africa or EUBAM in Libya) focusing
on coast-guard and maritime governance capabilities (IgeoInfl2).
But beyond the stewardship of the oceans, the EU’s maritime
security strategy is informed by geopolitical elements. Maritime
areas in the periphery of Europe and beyond have a “strategic
value” ([8]: 4) to the EU (Tgeopol1, Tgeopol2 and DgeoInfl2):
Some maritime zones or areas within the global maritime
domain are, because of their strategic value or potential for
crisis or instability, of particular importance to the EU and its
Member States. The Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the global
network of shipping lanes to and from Asia, Africa and the
Americas are of critical importance (Commission, [6]: 6).
This Strategy takes particular regard of each of the European
sea and subsea basins, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the
Mediterranean and the North Sea, as well as of the Arctic
waters, the Atlantic Ocean and the outermost regions ([8]: 4).
Contributing to the security of the seas beyond the EU’s
jurisdictional waters also serves the Union global geo-strategy,
which requires visual presence. The Commission advocated reg-
ular “EU-flagged maritime exercises with third countries […] in
order to improve the visibility of the EU in the global maritime
domain” (2014: 7). Without mentioning this very possibility, the
Council nevertheless stressed the fact that the EU has interests to
defend over the world’s oceans, which are not bounded by
geographical considerations. Although they revolve around the
‘liberal’ notions of the freedom of the sea and the promotion of
good governance at sea, they are nonetheless informed by ‘realist’
power politics considerations (DgeoInfl1):
The Union stresses the importance of its assuming increased
responsibilities as a global security provider, at the international
level and in particular in its neighbourhood, thereby also enhan-
cing its own security and its role as a strategic global actor. ([8]: 8)
Member States’ Armed Forces should play a strategic role at sea
and from the sea and provide global reach, flexibility and access
that enable the EU and its Member States to contribute to the full
spectrum of maritime responsibilities. ([8]: 10)
In sum, despite the fact that it originates in the Commission’s
Maritime Affairs department’s work related to the security of the
maritime domain, which was mainly informed by economic
considerations (c.f. IMP), and despite the fact that the EU MSS
needed to be approved by the member states, this strategy tacitly
acknowledges the geographical if not the geopolitical dimension of
maritime security and directly takes those factors into account to
inform the EU’s objectives.
4.3. The EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
One maritime region which has attracted the EU’s attention is
the GoG, for which the Council has adopted in March 2014 a
Strategy. This strategy highlights the various regional threats,
including IUUF, illicit dumping of waste, piracy and armed robbery
at sea, trafficking of human beings, narcotics, arms and counterfeit
goods, smuggling of migrants, as well as oil theft ([7]: 2). In other
words, the EU has acknowledged the need to be more active in the
GoG due to maritime security threats (Tgeopol1). This is a striking
example of how maritime security issues, even very distant from
home, can engender and justify the need to take into consideration
distant (maritime) regions. In practice, the EU is committed to
“identify geographic and thematic priority zones to focus the EU
response, including in cooperation with other international actors”
(9) and to help “states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the
rule of law and effective governance across the region, including
improvements in maritime administration and law enforcement
through multiagency cooperation by police, navy, military, coast-
guard, customs and immigration services” (3). In 2013, the Union




Tacit link between maritime security and geopolitics Geographical definition of MS risks and threats (Tgeopol1) Recurrent geographical references throughout
the text (Tgeopol2)
Explicit link between maritime security and geopolitics Reference to the concept of geopolitics (Egeopol1) Reference to the influence of geography re MS
(Egeopol2)
Indirect influence of geographical and/or geopolitical
factors on maritime security objectives
Reference to the need to tackle MS threats beyond one’s
boundary and/or territorial waters (IgeoInfl1)
Reference to the need to police the ‘global’
maritime domain (IgeoInfl2)
Direct influence of geographical and/or geopolitical
factors on maritime security objectives
Direct reference to geopolitical interests in the maritime
domain (DgeoInfl1)
Mention of geographical locations when
referring to MS objectives (DgeoInfl2)
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reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea” (7) (IgeoInfl1).
As summarised in Table 3, in the three cases, the geopolitical
approach to maritime security is present although tacitly acknowl-
edged. In both the UK NSMS and the EU MSS, policy objectives are
indirectly and directly informed by geographical or even geopoli-
tical considerations. Indicators are found throughout the texts. In
the case of the GoG strategy, the influence is indirect (i.e. the need
to tackle threats), but the very existence of an EU GoG strategy
indicates the Union’s increasing geopolitical thinking.
5. Discussion
Maritime security is intrinsically geopolitical, since it is about
projecting public power beyond one’s external boundary within
the ‘global’ maritime domain. The results from the analysis of the
three above-discussed examples show that geographical and
geopolitical considerations do inform states’ and the EU’s mar-
itime security objectives and goals, although geopolitical consid-
erations remain tacit. The fact that the EU MSS was approved by 27
member states allows some generalisations beyond the very EU’s
dynamics. Not only geography does impact on the boundary of
what is possible to achieve in terms of freedom of the seas and
good governance at sea, but states (and the EU) have also
developed maritime geopolitical visions, based on the fact that
securing adjacent and distant maritime spaces will positively
impact on one’s security on land. Furthermore, contributing to
global maritime governance may well ‘hide’ more ‘realist’ policy
agendas in the form of a justification for power and forces
projection beyond one’s legal zone of competencies.
It is interesting to note that the difference between the UK and
the EU documents is limited despite the fact that they are very
different actors. References to geopolitical considerations are tacit in
both the UK and EU documents whereas policy objectives are directly
and indirectly influenced by geographical considerations. This shows
that, despite its peculiar decision-making process that often reduces
foreign and security policy decisions to the smaller common
denominator between member states, geopolitical considerations
have been taken into account by the EU. This may indicate that
member states have successfully uploaded their strategic and secur-
ity policy objectives into the European Union. In the case of the EU
MSS, since it originated in the Commission’s IMP and subsequent
initiatives, it is not surprising to find that it advocates a global vision
for the EU and thus frames maritime security objectives within the
broader role and place of the EU as a global actor.
The fact that geopolitics is only tacitly acknowledged but that it
does influence states’ and the EU’s policies and objectives shows
that the geopolitical dimension of maritime security exists and
matters but is still not acknowledged explicitly, which may be due
to the enduring negative connotation of the term ‘geopolitics’
discussed above. Practitioners, especially in the Western liberal
democratic world tend to negate their using geopolitical (or
simply power politics) factors when it comes to foreign and
security policy decisions-making. This can be explained by their
accountability to a (supposedly) peaceful public opinion that will
expect ‘liberal’ justifications for the projection of power into the
maritime domain (such as ‘contributing to the security of the
global commons’) rather than ‘realist’ arguments (such as ‘the
need to control space beyond one’s external boundary’). For their
part, academics who overlook the geopolitical dimension of
maritime security take out of the equation a factor that contributes
to explaining states’ and the EU’s maritime security policies.
So, could geopolitical approaches be included in maritime secur-
ity studies? Maritime security scholars form a very eclectic group
comprising political scientists, geographers, lawyers, economists,
criminologists, anthropologists, etc, resulting in different ontologies,
epistemologies and methodologies. Referring to the case of piracy
studies, Christian Bueger showed that various scholars with diver-
ging approaches and methodologies are nevertheless united by their
“shared interest in understanding piracy and developing responses to
it through the use of a scientific method” ([1]: 408). This is true,
however their approaches are not always commensurable and
maritime security studies remain scholarly very fragmented as of
today. Lawyers focus on jurisdictional and legal issues, criminologists
on criminals’ business models and culture, and so on so forth. Despite
practitioners’ increasing tendency to acknowledge the geopolitical
dimension of maritime security, this has left almost no room for
geopolitical considerations within maritime security studies, except
perhaps in the case of some political geographers and strategic
studies analysts as mentioned in the introduction. The results
discussed above should serve to highlight the indirect and direct
links between geographical/geopolitical considerations and maritime
security policies, as well as the fact that they are at least tacitly
acknowledged in high level strategic documents.
6. Conclusion
Be it understood as a concept or a set of practices, maritime
security has a geopolitical dimension. The maritime domain is a
space within which human actors operate, either to perform illegal,
disruptive and damaging activities or to police and secure the sea in
order to fight criminal actors. Maritime security refers to a geo-
graphical space, that is to say the sea, which has different char-
acteristics compared to the land. The location of threats impacts on
the way states and non-sate actors’ security is affected. States’
maritime security interests result in a practice consisting in project-
ing security beyond their external boundary into the global mar-
itime domain. Thus, zones of interests are defined, which extend
beyond one’s legal zone of competencies. In security narratives,
those maritime zones are represented as vital for one’s security,
which justifies power projection activities. In sum, as demonstrated
by the analysis of three recent maritime security strategies, the
geopolitical dimension of maritime security indirectly and directly
informs states’ and the EU’s maritime security policies.
Beyond technical, operational, legal/judicial, economic, military
and cultural elements, there is a geopolitical dimension of
Table 3
The geopolitical dimension of three maritime security strategies.
Geopolitical approach to maritime security Policy objectives informed by geopolitical considerations
Tacit Explicit Indirect Direct
Tgeopol1 Tgeopol2 Egeopol1 Egeopol2 IgeoInfl1 IgeoInfl2 DgeoInfl1 DgeoInfl2
UK NSMS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
EU MSS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
EU GoG ✓ ✓
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maritime security, which is tacitly acknowledged by practitioners
who are nevertheless still reluctant to talk about geo-strategy. This
dimension is also rather neglected by scholars who tend to focus
on other dimensions due to the fragmentation of social science in
general and of maritime security studies in particular.
When states and regional organisations stress their need, will or
duty to ‘secure the freedom of the seas’, to ‘police the global
commons’, to ‘promote good governance at sea’, or to ‘assure the
stewardship of the ocean’, there are geopolitical forces and factors at
play and not only ‘benign’ intentions. The goal of this article is to
initiate debates within maritime security studies, so as scholars
acknowledge the relevance of this geopolitical dimension and further
engage with it.
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